Discrimination and the Supreme Court

Since the establishment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which, in succession to the abolition of slavery, guarantees “all persons born or naturalized in the United States” will not be denied “equal protection of the laws,” society has had to struggle in every atmosphere to resolve racial conflict and to determine whose laws are constitutional when referring to race. Initially, the court was tentative to rule strongly for the minority; however, as time continues the Supreme Court, and other underlying courts, play a major role in the movement towards anti-discrimination. It becomes the leading advocate for minority’s rights and protection of their continued pursuit of happiness, which eventually means absolute equality.

The first case the Supreme Court accepted in response to the Civil War Amendments and to their subsequent reactions such as Jim Crow laws and segregation was Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. The petitioner of the case, and eventual plaintiff in error, was Plessy¬¬––a resident of Louisiana who was one-eighth African. Although he purchased a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway from New Orleans to Covington and was assigned to sit in the all-black train coach, Plessy sat in the white coach. An act from the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana enacts that “[n]o person, or persons, shall be admitted to occupy seats in coaches, other than, the ones, assigned, to them on account of the race they belong to.” Therefore, by Louisiana state law, the conductor was required to eject him from the train from which he was taken to the parish jail of New Orleans. After being committed for trial for violation of the above act, the petitioner filed against Hon. John H. Ferguson, judge of the criminal District Court for the parish in New Orleans, in the Supreme Court under Plessy’s Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The Constitutional question became whether or not segregation is a violation of a citizen’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, because it was immediately ruled that the train car did not intend to put non-whites into servitude and did not apply to the Thirteenth Amendment. Taking into consideration the implications and purposes of segregation, the Supreme Court ruled that it is “within the police power of the state” to separate utilities by race as long as the spaces are equal. Arguing that segregation does not imply that the black race is inferior, the Court’s decision coined the term “separate but equal.” Because the Court was able to consider a similar case in Boston, an abolitionist state, where in Roberts v. City of Boston segregation in schools was considered necessary for the “promotion of the public good,” the doctrine that segregation “deprived of no rights” was established. The plaintiff’s counter-argument that this would justify the state legislature to enact laws that “require separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain color…or requiring white men’s houses to be painted white, and colored men’s black.” In response to this, the Court responded that the exercise of police power must be reasonable, meaning “with a view to the promotion of [people’s] comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.” The plaintiff also argued that segregation stamps the black race with a “badge of inferiority.” Denying this to be true, the final decision ruled that because “[l]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences,” segregation was constitutional, and the judgment of the Louisiana court was affirmed. Also, the Court left it up to individual states what percentage blood indicates whether or not an individual is white.

As racial tensions grew to new heights and caused further discrimination, endangering opportunity for black children, this decision needed to be readdressed. It was therefore overthrown in 1954 in the Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. As the plaintiff, the “negro children of elementary school age residing in Topeka” faced the Topeka Board of Education. Some black children wanted to transfer to and attend an all-white school, which was legally segregated by a Kansas statute, which permitted cities of more than 15,000 in population to “maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students.” Seeking to obtain admission to the public schools of their communities through integration, the children filed suit to the District Court of Kansas, which found segregation to have “a detrimental effect upon Negro children,” but denied relief because the schools were substantially tangibly equal. The petitioner, therefore, appealed based upon a violation of the children’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court heard the argument, although the issue of segregation’s constitutionality had already been addressed in Plessy v. Ferguson, based upon four reasons: public education was nonexistent when the Fourteenth Amendment was established, public education needed to be newly acknowledged for its “full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation,” Plessy v. Ferguson did not involve educations but transportation, and the decision would not be based upon tangible factors between different-race schools, but upon “the effect of segregation itself on public education.” In the Supreme Court’s decision, the right to education was established as an equality and pursuit of happiness: “it is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” Also, the negative effects of segregation on education were based, again, on the argument of implied inferiority. The Court confirmed that segregation generates a feeling of inferiority for black people, that it is detrimental to children’s growth, that it affects a child’s motivation, and it deprives them of certain benefits which they would otherwise receive. The final decision officially overturns Plessy v. Ferguson and confirms that the doctrine “separate but equal” becomes inherently unequal, so segregation deprives the plaintiffs and others similarly situated of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Again in April of 1955 the Supreme Court was forced to readdress Brown v. Board of Education in order to enforce and require that all public schools follow the Court’s decision and integrate public schools; however, the schools are given “necessary time” as long as they work to change their systems “with deliberation.”

After Brown v. Board’s strong ruling that established the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment would thereafter extend, educational and employment programs began to offer minority groups benefits in their systems. Those not receiving such benefits, the white majority, feared for their equal opportunity. In reaction sprung Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.

The Medical School of the University of California at Davis denied Allan Bakke, a white male, admission to the school when four spots for admission were still available. These spots were reserved for “minority group” applicants. Bakke’s “benchmark” scores, a combination of standardized tests, grade point averages and recommendations, were significantly higher than the average of that of the sixteen students admitted for the school’s “minority group” quota. The medical school only admitted 100 students per year, and sixteen of those spots were unattainable for advantaged white students. Therefore, Bakke competed for 84 spots while others could compete for 100. Upon his second rejection of admission, Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of California, arguing exclusion from school on the basis of race and that it was a direct violation of the 14th Amendment. The California Court, by validity of the Special admissions program under the Equal Protections clause, says it to be unconstitutional.

Upon this finding, the Supreme Court requests supplemental briefing on the appealed case. The case had become a “battle over the scope of judicial review,” meaning the methods in which admissions decisions were made. The petitioner, the Medical School, preferred to view it as a “goal” of minority representation, while the respondent, Bakke, labeled it a “racial quota.” Ignoring perspective, the Court had to address that “the special admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background.” So the constitutional question became whether or not affirmative admissions programs of any kind were constitutional.

Having established that both minority and majority groups can face discrimination and inequality before the law, the Court looked at the possible repercussions of not addressing such a suit: “individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in order to advance societal standing,” “preferential programs may only reinforce stereotypes,” and innocent members of a certain race would unfairly be forced to bear the “burdens of redressing grievances not of their own making.” On the other hand, the court also considered the positive reasons for the justification of such a program: reducing the “historical deficit” of “traditionally disfavored minorities” in medicine, “countering the effects of social discrimination,” increasing the number of physicians who will practice medicine in “communities currently undeserved,” and benefiting from and “ethnically diverse student body.” Deciding that these specific reasons do not hold up against the Constitution, the Supreme Court thought the Medical school’s program to be unconstitutional. However, a question still remained: whether the “programs racial classification is necessary to promote [University] interests.” In this discussion, the Court addressed “Four essential freedoms of a University,” including the right to decide who may be admitted to study. The court’s decision on this topic was a compromise. It concluded that the race of an applicant could not be criteria for a certain spot; however, it could “tip the balance” just like any other different quality. Like a unique geographical origin, race could be deemed a “plus,” as long as each applicant was treated equally as an individual. Therefore, the Supreme Court, in suggesting new reformed methods of constitutional affirmative admission, affirmed the California Court’s original decision ruling in favor of Bakke.

However, after the entire judgment, it is revealed that “Mr. Justice Powell agrees that some uses of race in university admissions are permissible and, therefore…reversing the judgment below insofar as it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs in the future…” With this notion, the final decision becomes fragmented. Although the program was deemed unconstitutional, this suggests that in the future, other means of constitutional affirmative admissions will be possible.

The ruling in a similar case following this one better clarifies the meaning for the future of affirmative admissions programs as they apply to public schools. In Barbara Grutter v. Lee Bollinger, the petitioner, Grutter, applied in 1997 to the University of Michigan Law School. Because of the school’s focus on admitting students diverse in all aspects, Grutter filed suit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan upon rejection of admission. She argued for the violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights.

As an opportunity to reaffirm the disjointed and slightly convoluted decision of the Bakke decision, the Supreme Court accepted the case. The Law school’s policy for admissions was upheld on the basis of Bakke by the decision of the Court. In addition, the optimism for racial equality in the Court is reflected through a specific rule in keeping admissions policies constitutional. There is a requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have a termination pointed that “assures all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.” It is the striving for equality that brightens this case.

The same issue of the minorities’ specific interests and programs with comparison to those of the majority is also reflected outside of the school setting, but in the work-force setting with relation to minority “set-aside” programs. Again, the white majority questions the constitutionality of these special benefits provided by the government. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena in 1995, Petition Adarand Constructors, Inc. filed suit against the Subcontracting Compensation Clause program, arguing that it violated the owners’ Fifth Amendment rights of equal due process of law.

In 1989 the Central Federal Lands Highway Division administered a highway construction project in Colorado to Mountain Gravel & Construction Company. Both Adarand and Gonzales Construction Company placed bids, and Adarand’s bid was lower. However, Mountain Gravel hired Gonzales Construction Company because of additional compensation for hiring “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” As the petitioner, Adarand filed suit in the Court of Colorado in Croson. Again the constitutional question is whether or not social and racial minorities receiving extra benefits from the government is constitutional.

The unconstitutionality that this District Court determined was the presumption that the qualifications for “disadvantaged individuals” was directly related to race. The Court ruled that qualifications for receiving benefits should be regulated with “strict scrutiny.” However, in another case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC” (1990) ruled that the same decisions when subject to “benign preference” should only undergo “intermediate scrutiny.” The Supreme Court took the appeal in order to set matters straight among inconsistencies. The Court’s decision was that all racial classification should undergo strict scrutiny by a reviewing court: “such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Therefore, the Supreme Court overruled the Metro Broadcasting decision and determined, again, that advantage is constitutional when in moderation and necessary for government interests.

The dissenting opinion in this case mentions, again, the badge of inferiority. Stating government sponsored discrimination based upon “benign prejudice” is “racial discrimination, plain and simple.” Although the tables have turned and instead of preventing a black man to enter a white train car the government is paying him double it would pay a white man to build it, the badge of inferiority returns. The Supreme Court decisions, after Plessy v. Ferguson, all support minorities’ rights in order to compensate for past grievances; however, it is quite possible that the inability of the Court to let go of minority “set-aside” programs in order to protect from discrimination is the very thing preventing its disappearance. Just like in Plessy v. Ferguson the Court would not let go of segregation for fear of the repercussions, but in Brown v. Board when it finally did, integration found its way into schools across the country, in the same way the Court holds on to minority advantage programs for fear of disproportionateness in opportunity; however, maybe the abandonment of such training wheels would allow society to find equality naturally.