The political parties in the United States began as factions and have swelled and subsided in their platforms, representatives, funding, and organization since. James Madison predicted the development of ideological divides in government when he described factions as “sown in the nature of man” (Federalist 10, Woll, 175). However, he could have never predicted the evolution and changing influence of political parties on his beloved Constitutional government. It is therefore the responsibility of political scientists to analyze political parties’ role the constitutional republic of the United States. Beginning with James Madison’s Federalist 10 and continuing through David R. Mayhew’s contemporary analysis, this group of documents becomes an examination of political parties after 1950; after setting the historical basis, they represent the transition from The Downs Model of political parties to divided government marked by what Arthur Paulson refers to as “ideological polarization” in American politics.
The Downs Model was created by Anthony Downs to describe the relationship among citizens, political parties, and policy in United States government. Downs argues that voters hope to maximize the chance that the policies they favor will be enacted in government policy and that political parties want to win office. With this theory along with public opinion Downs interprets a relevant strategy for political parties. Because the majority of the electorate (voters) are moderate in their views, both the Democratic and Republican Parties set their ideology close to moderate views, the Democratic Party just to the left of moderate and the Republican Party just to the right. Neither party strays far from the midpoint of public opinion.
To interpret the ways in which political parties have changed and affected government, it is important to know their original relationship with government. Although political parties play an important role in the United States’ democratic system, the Founding Fathers’ based their limitations of politically-involved factions [political parties] in fear. James Madison defined factions as “the mortal disease under which popular governments have everywhere perished” (Federalist 10, Woll, 174). They intended to weaken the influence of factions to their greatest ability. In Federalist 10, Madison justifies the system of the American constitutional republic with its ability to control the negative effects of factions through separation of powers and a large electorate. First he explains that there are “two methods of removing the mischiefs of faction,” either by “removing its causes” or “controlling its effects” (Federalist 10, Woll, 175). However, he admits that divided interests are inherent to man, especially with divisions in class and possessions, and as a result, so are factions. He writes that to remove these factions would be to “abolish Liberty” (Federalist 10, Woll, 175), so relief from a majority’s ability “to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens” (Federalist 10, Woll, 176) could only come from controlling its effects. Madison’s solution is an extensive government in which power is delegated to patriotic citizens who will prevent the majority interests from overpowering those of the minority, a large electorate where the interests are varied among citizens, and finally a complex separation of power. All three, he writes, will “make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens” (Federalist 10, Woll, 178). The theme in his writing is that factions are a malady, not positive for government, and that US government is designed to prevent them from gaining power.
The advantage of great numbers that Madison associates with successful government, E. E. Schattschneider refers to as “labyrinthine framework” and inviting political parties to “strangle themselves in the machinery of government” (Document 31, Woll, 179). In Schattschneider’s analysis of the positive aspects of political parties, he develops the idea of the Downs Model. He criticizes the Constitution as having a “dual attitude” (Document 31, Woll, 179), being both pro-party and anti-party. He goes on to describe that the authors of the Constitution did not consider that “parties might be used as beneficent instruments of popular government” (Document 31, Woll, 179). In Schattschneider’s argument for political parties’ rightful place in government, he makes a distinction between common and special interests. He argues that political parties also mobilize common interests and therefore connect government policy to a “body of agreement” of society (Document 31, Woll, 180). He says because many people engage in both common and conflicting interests, “the divisions are not so clearly marked, and the alignment of people according to interests requires an enormous shuffling back and forth from one side to the other” (Document 31, Woll, 181). The Downs Model originates in common interest. Because the majority of the electorate agrees on many issues, political parties must situate themselves not far from moderate in order to both attract and represent their citizens. Political parties, according to the Downs model, have to account for this ‘enormous shuffling.’
With a basis of political parties original relationship with government and then the growth of political parties as a connection for American citizens to the republican interworkings of government policy through common interests, the next documents evaluate the transition of political party nature in the United States. During the 20th century, political scientists argued that a weak party system was a barrier to effective democratic leadership, so The American Political Science Association (APSA) formed a committee on political parties and wrote and report in 1950 called Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System. Document 32 is taken from the “Role of the Political Parties” section of this text. Because the committee considered political parties as “indispensable instruments of government…which provide the electorate with a proper range of choice between alternatives of action” (Document 32, Woll, 183) and anticipated the decline in political parties in the US, it sought to improve upon the political party. The members of the committee called it the Responsible Party System. They defined the system: “An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs,” and that they have “an Effective Opposition Party” (Document 32, Woll, 184). This responsible party system sets the standard for modern political party analysis.
Many political scientists would agree that the decay that APSA predicted in 1950 became a reality and that the second half of the century was marked by the decline of political parties and by split government void of realignment. Arthur Paulson disagrees. He interprets the transition away from a Downs model “umbrella party” (Document 33, Woll, 187) trend where each party shines it shade on a number of ideologies as a shift towards the responsible party system: “nonideological coalitions of factions with diverse interests” (Document 33, Woll, 189). He redefines political parties as shifting towards an “ideological polarization” in politics where parties are increasingly engaged in “interest articulation” (Document 33, Woll, 189). Is this positive? He says yes: “What is emerging is a party system featuring two ideologically homogenized political parties offering the electorate much more polarized choices than has generally been the American experience” (Document 33, Woll, 189). Although Paulson rationalizes the transition away from the Downs model, he admits that the danger in this system is political “gridlock” (Document 33, Woll, 188). If the two parties are so ideologically different and the legislative and the executive branches are engaged in split government (they are governed by the opposite party), then the government becomes stuck in legislative paralysis. Paulson’s argument for encouraging interest-driven, polarized political parties is unconvincing. His constant use of examples from England’s Parliamentary party system where one party rules in both the executive and the legislative seems irrational. His love of English government and interest in unified party government leads back to Madison’s original fears for US government. Although a more “national articulation of more distinct interests and issue alternatives” (Document 33, Woll, 190) is appealing, Madison would tear his hair out at the idea of encouraging faction-driven party government.
In the last document, Mayhew, like Paulson, sees the change in political parties simply as a transition and not as decay; however, Mayhew takes the opposite stance to Paulson’s. While Paulson advocates unified government and believes that divided government means unsuccessful government, Mayhew goes to all levels to disprove Paulson’s view. Mayhew writes “Unified versus divided control has probably not made a notable difference during the postwar era” (Document 34, Woll, 193). He argues that unified party government leads to “seriously defective legislation,” “programmatic [in]coherence,” and decreased individual power because the proper checks and balances are overlooked (Document 34, Woll, 196). Mayhew concludes that there is a “strong pluralist component” with checks and balances broken by party loyalty, that this is “a matter of political culture¬¬––perhaps a survival of republicanism,” and that “British style governing by party majorities does not have much of a chance” (Document 34, Woll, 199).
After Mayhew’s and Paulson’s disagreement, the transition of political parties takes full circle. It returns to the issue of one political party ruling both in the majority and in government, Madison’s fear and Paulson’s ideal. This year’s election is a critical election; there is a good chance that both the Presidency and the Congress will become realigned in the same political party. We must then ask ourselves, now that political parties have strayed away from the Downsian model and identify with polarized ideals, does unified government hand too much political power to the party? Or is Paulson right and it has rightfully influential sway? Or is Mayhew right, does it not really matter? It would be a significant change in US government if the legislative and executive branches are both controlled by the Democratic Party, for not only might it mean sweeping change in policy, but it would be the first time in over a decade. Maybe the question is really whether or not the electorate still falls under the Downsian model or if politics have led us into an era of split ideology and polarized society.
-Rachel Mary Rosenberg
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