Term Limits
Is it constitutional for states to change the term limits from what is stated in the Constitution? The Supreme Court case of U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thorton set a standard for States being able to limit terms of representatives in office. The Supreme Court case of Cook v. Gralike then followed as a response. Both of these cases were deemed unconstitutional because of the changes from the Constitution. These two court cases show an example for other cases to follow.
The case of U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thorton argues the constitutionality of the Arkansas Constitution. Amendment 73 of the Arkansas Constitution says that, “Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas. Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States Senate from Arkansas.” This amendment goes against the qualifications for office set forth in the Constitution. The only qualifications in Article I of the Constitution are “No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained the age of 25 years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." The reason that Amendment 73 might be unconstitutional is because it adds to what is said in the Constitution.
The Constitution does not say anything about States being able to States being able to set their own term limits, this is where the question of constitutionality comes in. Even though the Constitution does not talk about the States, it should be assumed that they have to stick with the term limits in the Constitution.
On November 13, 1992 respondent Robbie Hill filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Arkansas saying that Amendment 73 of the Arkansas Constitution is unconstitutional because it sets limits that are not stated in the Constitution. Arkansas Supreme Court decided that the Constitutionality depends on two things. The first is whether the Constitution prohibits States from adding or altering the Constitution limits and the second is if the Constitution does forbid alters, whether Amendment 73 is formulated as restriction to be on the ballot or outright disqualification from running.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided by a vote of 5 to 4 that it is unconstitutional for States to alter the qualifications set forth in the Constitution. In order for the court to make this decision they looked back at the case of Powell v. McCormick (1969). This case dealt with Qualification Clauses in the exclusion of a Member of Congress. The conclusion of this case was the Congress cannot add or alter the qualifications set in the Constitution. These two cases set a clear ruling for adding or altering to the Constitution.
In 1996, as a response to the Supreme Court’s decision of the case U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, Missouri voters adopted an amendment to Article VIII of their Constitution. This amendment would “instruct” each member of Missouri’s congressional delegation “to use all of his or her delegated powers to pass the Congressional Term Limits Amendment.” The amendment would limit the House of Representatives term limit to three terms and two terms in the Senate. The Amendment also directs the Missouri Secretary of State to determine whether a statement on a candidate’s term limits should be placed by his or her name on the election ballot.
Don Gralike brought the issue to court to stop the Secretary from implementing the amendment. The District Court agreed with Gralike and found that Article VIII went against what was previously stated in the Constitution. This was because the court decided it added additional qualifications that burdened a candidates first amendment rights to speak freely on the issue of term limits.
Both cases show a clear example of what the Supreme Court sees as Constitutional when it comes to term limits. These two cases were very similar and the outcomes were also the same.
Electoral College
The cases of George W. Bush v. Palm Beach and George W. Bush v. Albert Gore were both surrounding the 2000 election and the recount. In a short period of time two cases arose arguing the recount of Florida. The second case, George W. Bush v. Albert Gore, is a reaction to the decision made in the first case.
The 2000 election caused many complications in Florida. George W. Bush v. Palm Beach surrounds the issue of recount in Florida. On November 8, 2000, the day after the election, the votes in Florida were 2,909,135 for Bush and 2,907,351 for Gore. Bush won by 1,784 votes, but because this was less than one half percent of the votes cast, an automatic recount occurred. After the recount the margin by which Bush had won was much smaller. As a reaction to this, Gore requested a recount in four counties: Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami- Dade. The two parties than had conflicting views on the recount because of the Florida Election Code. Then on November 14th, as an action brought on from Volusia and joined by Palm Beach, Gore, and the Florida Democratic Party, the Florida Circuit Court decided that a seven day deadline was mandatory, but Volusia could turn theirs in at a later date. It was also decided that the Secretary of State could use her discretion to decide whether to include the late amended returns in a state-wide certification.
At this point all of the rulings from the District Court seem to make sense, but the power that was given to the Secretary of State. If one of the counties were to turn in their recount after the seven day deadline it is possible that those votes are not going to count. But if you are missing a section of votes, then the state is not representing all of their citizens.
With the decision that the Secretary was given she set a criteria which would decide what to do with late recounts. The Secretary said that by 2 pm on November 15th, any county that wants to turn in late recounts must submit a written statement of the facts and circumstances as to why the recount is late. Four counties then submitted late recounts and the Secretary decided that none of them seemed to need an extension. Then on November 16th as a reaction to the Secretary’s decision, the Florida Democratic Party and Gore filed a motion in the State Court, “arguing that the Secretary had acted arbitrarily and in contempt of the court’ s earlier ruling.” The next day the court denied this motion, saying that the Secretary had not acted out of line and had used the earlier ruling of the court. They then appealed to the First District Court of Appeal which sent the issue to the Florida Supreme Court. The Court said that a final count could not be declared until order from the Court.
People around the country were growing anxious as the decision was continuing to be put off. The issue of each county having to recount their votes had grown into much bigger deal. Finally on November 21st the Supreme Court made a decision. In the court’s mind there were two principle questions: “whether a discrepancy between an original machine return and a sample manual recount resulting from the way a ballot has been marked or punched is an “error in vote tabulation” justifying a full manual recount; and how to reconcile what it spoke of as two conflicts in Florida’ s election laws.” For the first issue the court decided that a discrepancy between a sample manual recount and machine count due to the way in which the ballot was marked does not constitute an error in tabulation sufficient for a manual recount. When it came to the second issue the court decided that the voting laws are contradictory. The court said that what the Secretary was ok because of what was said in the Declaration Rights of the State of Florida Constitution, but the court stated, “Because of our reluctance to rewrite the Florida Election Code, we conclude that we must invoke the equitable powers of this Court to fashion a remedy.” The court set a deadline of November 26th at 5 pm for the recounts. The court also directed the Secretary to accept manual counts submitted prior to the deadline.
The decision made by the Supreme Court of Florida allowed all of the counties to have time to finish their votes. The court acted both constitutionally and democratically when it came to their decision. This case was not the end of the 2000 election. After the Supreme Court made these decisions the case of George W. Bush v. Albert Gore opened, and the recounting continued.
The court case of George W. Bush v. Albert Gore is continuing from the earlier case in November. On November 26th the results of the election were in and declared Bush the winner of Florida’s 25 electoral votes. The next day Gore filed a complaint in Leon County Circuit Court. Gore’s argument was against Section 102.168 of the Florida Constitution. This section says that, “receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election'' shall be grounds for a contest.” Gore was trying to find the small fraction of votes that he had lost the election with. The court decided that Gore did not have enough evidence for this to be a true argument. Gore then appealed to the First district Court of Appeal, which then sent the issue to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court decided that Gore did not have enough proof for Nassau County and Palm Beach County. Gore claimed that 3,300 ballots from those counties were not “legal” votes. The Supreme Court did decide that Gore had reason to challenge Miami-Dade because there was 9,000 ballots that failed to count votes for President when done by the machine. During this time many new votes were found that were not first accounted for. A gain of 215 votes and 168 legal votes were added to Gore’s total vote. These votes were then added to the total count.
At the Supreme Court seven of the justices agreed that there are constitutional issues with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court. The unconstitutionality came from the remedy ordered by the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court said that Florida legislature intended to obtain safe-harbor benefits, which is a violation of the Florida Election Code.
A lot of controversy for this election came from the ballot cards. Florida used ballot cards in which you have to punch a hole and this is thought to be part of the reason for the recount. These two cases resolve around the same issue and Gore’s want to be President. Gore continued to push the recount and found different reasons for recounts.
-Christen
Saturday, February 28, 2009
Monday, February 23, 2009
Student Speech
Student speech rights are ones that often are over-looked. In many educational systems students are expected to give up certain constitutional rights when attending school. At our own school one could argue student speech is an issue. There are many circumstances of censorship, unreasonable punishment, vocal restrictions, and other limits of freedom, which one could argue our school enacts against the constitution.
Supreme court judges often use previous cases on similar topics to help them make their decisions. So, it is important to discuss those on student speech in order of occurrence as judges continuously reference previous cases to prove their points. So the first case is Tinker v Des Moins Independent Community School District. The petitioners in this case were John Tinker who was 15 and Christopher Eckhard who was 16, both boys attending high schools in Des Moines. Also was petitioner Mary Beth Tinker who was 13 and at junior high school. The respondent was the Des Moins Independent School District.
In December 1965, at the Eckhard home some students and adults met in Des Moins to talk about the Vietnam War and possible forms of protest. They decided to wear black armbands in support of a truce throughout the holiday season. When the Des Moins schools heard of this they made a policy that stated any student wearing a black armband would be suspended until they choose to take it off. So, when the three petitioners arrived at school with their armbands they were suspended and didn’t go back to school until after New Years as that was when they stopped wearing the armbands. They filed a complaint but the district court decided the school acted constitutionally. On appeal the court was split and the case went to the Supreme Court. At the Supreme Court they found it was a violation of the students 1st and 14th amendments. The court decided that the decision to suspend and not allow students to peacefully, silently, voice their opinions is against the 1st amendment, and as it was a specifically targeted group of protesters rather than including all groups which wore something to symbolize a cause, it violated the 14th amendment.
One statement made by Justice Fortas, which is used in many cases to come is, “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” The issue at hand was not a simple school violation by a student, but the school violated the student’s right to pure speech. The only time in a school situation that the 1st amendment can be slightly put aside is if the act disrupts class, or the learning process, or has a direct negative affect on the school’s ability to teach. There was no proof, however, that the wearing of the armbands disrupted any class or instigated any unruly behavior. The school banned the wearing of something that served as a silent expression of ones opinions, and in no way created disturbance or infringed on other student’s rights. Also, the school district made the decision based on their fear that there would be disturbance of the school if the armbands were allowed; however, because they had to legitimate proof or reason to think so it does not justify it. Our Constitution protects taking the risk of allowing those students to wear t he armbands to voice their opinions, especially when those opinions are political as that is what our country is based on. Our Constitutional rights are meant to follow us despite our location, or age. Although it is true that adults have greater constitutional rights than students, as long as the use of the 1st amendment does not greatly cause conflict within a school or deprive other students of their rights and access to learning then it is not excusable to punish these students. And thus the Supreme Court found in favor of the petitioner.
The next case occurred in 1986, BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403 v. Fraser. In 1983 Matthew N. Fraser gave a speech to nominate a friend for the elective office. This speech was given in front of around 600 students including freshman who would have been 14 years old. The issue, however, is that the speech itself was a large sexual metaphor with explicit description. Many teachers and students were upset by the speech and the principal suspended Fraser as he violated the rule of the school, which stated, “Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser’s father, the technical respondent (as Matthew Fraser the actual respondent is a minor) brought it to the district court as a violation of his son’s 1st amendment right and the court agreed, then at the Court of Appeals they also agreed that it was a violation of Fraser’s first amendment right and the court used the Tinker example to make their judgment. Then the school, the petitioner took it to the Supreme Court where the ruling was reversed.
The Supreme Court recognized this case as very different from Tinker. The main difference is that in Tinker it was students who were peacefully expressing their political opinions, in Fraser it is a student using sexual and obscene language and causing a disruption in the education process at the school. In response to the Tinker case the court’s main argument is that the speech of Fraser hindered the schools ability to teach. The language used was deemed offensive to many people, and in violation of clear school rules. Many teachers had to take time from their classes to talk about the speech and what it meant. Fraser argued that there was no way of knowing he would be suspended as the school rules are not defined. In response to this the court stated that it is the school’s responsibility to protect against many possible violations and thus the rules are intentionally vague, but it is the school’s responsibility to declare what they believe to be disruptive and vulgur. The speech did nothing to further the education of his peers or to contribute to the school and thus the court found in favor of the respondent.
A few years later was HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Kuhlmeier in 1988. This case was about the issue of censorship in a school newspaper. The respondents, three Hazelwood East students from the staff of the school newspaper Spectrum, believe their 1st amendment rights were violated when two articles were not published in the newspaper. Two articles had been written, one on pregnancy within the school, and one on divorce. These two articles seemed to the petitioner Emerson, as well as petitioner Reynolds, to be inappropriate. Emerson was afraid that the articles were not anonymous enough and that students would be identified, also Emerson thought it unfair that the boyfriends and parents mentioned in these articles did not have the chance to defend themselves or the statements made against them. Also, the content of the articles about sex, contraceptives etc could be inappropriate for some students. Reynolds, the president of the school, was under the impression that there was no time for the articles to be edited to fix these issues and thus decided they should be deleted from the newspaper. The respondents then brought it to the district court who ruled it was not a violation of the 1st amendment, but the court of appeals ruled it was. Then the Supreme Court took the case and reversed the court of appeals decision.
The main argument the court made was that because it was a journalism class, that received grades and needed to follow certain guidelines the freedom of expression is slightly limited. Also, because it is the name and expenses of the school that go in to the paper they have more right to edit what goes in to it. If it were a student run magazine, or paper the situation would be different. The court explained the difference between this case and Tinker is that with Tinker the school is determining when to tolerate a student’s particular speech, but with this case the school is just determining whether to promote the particular speech by giving its name and resources. It can be argued that the articles would have interfered with school policy and education and were not following instruction for the journalism class and therefore it is not a violation of the student’s 1st amendment rights. So, the court found in favor of the petitioner.
The last case we have about student speech is Morse v. Frederick in 2007. In January 2002 when the Olympic Torch relay passed through Juneau, Alaska Juneau –Douglas High School allowed the students to take a small “field-trip” and watch as the relay passed by school. The respondent, Joseph Frederick a senior at JDHS came to school late that day. When the cameras and relay passed by he stood at the across the school with some friends, as he had not checked in to school yet, and held up a large banner that said “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” The entire school that went to watch the relay, as well as some news cameras, saw this banner. Principal Morse demanded Frederick to go to her office, and she then suspended him as he was suggesting and promoting the use of illegal drugs among his peers. This was a school violation and the sign was displayed during school hours at a school sanctioned event. The case was brought to the district court in which they used the Fraser decision to say the principal acted correctly as the banner intrudes upon the work of the school. The Supreme Court then had to see whether Frederick had a constitutional right to show the banner, and whether is he did if the principle was liable for charges. The Supreme Court found that Frederick had no such right.
The basis for this decision is that the sign held up directly had a negative effect on the school and its educational abilities, and caused disruption. Also, the banner promotes the use of illegal drugs which is a school violation and the school therefore has the right to punish that behavior. Frederick tried to argue that the banner was just nonsense and had no drug reference, but because of the vague and multiple interpretations it is still recognized as drug reference. In Tinker it was determined that student expression can only be suppressed if the expression disrupts the school. In Fraser, the difference is that Tinker was used for a political message and Fraser was of sexual innuendo, but Frederick adds a new element in as it has drug reference. It would be a different story if Frederick declared the sign had political or religious meaning, but because he does not there is no political debate or message he is trying to get across by revealing this banner. So because the banner did nothing other than disrupt the school, and violate a school rule about illegal drug implications the Supreme Court found in favor of Morse.
-Isabella
Supreme court judges often use previous cases on similar topics to help them make their decisions. So, it is important to discuss those on student speech in order of occurrence as judges continuously reference previous cases to prove their points. So the first case is Tinker v Des Moins Independent Community School District. The petitioners in this case were John Tinker who was 15 and Christopher Eckhard who was 16, both boys attending high schools in Des Moines. Also was petitioner Mary Beth Tinker who was 13 and at junior high school. The respondent was the Des Moins Independent School District.
In December 1965, at the Eckhard home some students and adults met in Des Moins to talk about the Vietnam War and possible forms of protest. They decided to wear black armbands in support of a truce throughout the holiday season. When the Des Moins schools heard of this they made a policy that stated any student wearing a black armband would be suspended until they choose to take it off. So, when the three petitioners arrived at school with their armbands they were suspended and didn’t go back to school until after New Years as that was when they stopped wearing the armbands. They filed a complaint but the district court decided the school acted constitutionally. On appeal the court was split and the case went to the Supreme Court. At the Supreme Court they found it was a violation of the students 1st and 14th amendments. The court decided that the decision to suspend and not allow students to peacefully, silently, voice their opinions is against the 1st amendment, and as it was a specifically targeted group of protesters rather than including all groups which wore something to symbolize a cause, it violated the 14th amendment.
One statement made by Justice Fortas, which is used in many cases to come is, “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” The issue at hand was not a simple school violation by a student, but the school violated the student’s right to pure speech. The only time in a school situation that the 1st amendment can be slightly put aside is if the act disrupts class, or the learning process, or has a direct negative affect on the school’s ability to teach. There was no proof, however, that the wearing of the armbands disrupted any class or instigated any unruly behavior. The school banned the wearing of something that served as a silent expression of ones opinions, and in no way created disturbance or infringed on other student’s rights. Also, the school district made the decision based on their fear that there would be disturbance of the school if the armbands were allowed; however, because they had to legitimate proof or reason to think so it does not justify it. Our Constitution protects taking the risk of allowing those students to wear t he armbands to voice their opinions, especially when those opinions are political as that is what our country is based on. Our Constitutional rights are meant to follow us despite our location, or age. Although it is true that adults have greater constitutional rights than students, as long as the use of the 1st amendment does not greatly cause conflict within a school or deprive other students of their rights and access to learning then it is not excusable to punish these students. And thus the Supreme Court found in favor of the petitioner.
The next case occurred in 1986, BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403 v. Fraser. In 1983 Matthew N. Fraser gave a speech to nominate a friend for the elective office. This speech was given in front of around 600 students including freshman who would have been 14 years old. The issue, however, is that the speech itself was a large sexual metaphor with explicit description. Many teachers and students were upset by the speech and the principal suspended Fraser as he violated the rule of the school, which stated, “Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser’s father, the technical respondent (as Matthew Fraser the actual respondent is a minor) brought it to the district court as a violation of his son’s 1st amendment right and the court agreed, then at the Court of Appeals they also agreed that it was a violation of Fraser’s first amendment right and the court used the Tinker example to make their judgment. Then the school, the petitioner took it to the Supreme Court where the ruling was reversed.
The Supreme Court recognized this case as very different from Tinker. The main difference is that in Tinker it was students who were peacefully expressing their political opinions, in Fraser it is a student using sexual and obscene language and causing a disruption in the education process at the school. In response to the Tinker case the court’s main argument is that the speech of Fraser hindered the schools ability to teach. The language used was deemed offensive to many people, and in violation of clear school rules. Many teachers had to take time from their classes to talk about the speech and what it meant. Fraser argued that there was no way of knowing he would be suspended as the school rules are not defined. In response to this the court stated that it is the school’s responsibility to protect against many possible violations and thus the rules are intentionally vague, but it is the school’s responsibility to declare what they believe to be disruptive and vulgur. The speech did nothing to further the education of his peers or to contribute to the school and thus the court found in favor of the respondent.
A few years later was HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Kuhlmeier in 1988. This case was about the issue of censorship in a school newspaper. The respondents, three Hazelwood East students from the staff of the school newspaper Spectrum, believe their 1st amendment rights were violated when two articles were not published in the newspaper. Two articles had been written, one on pregnancy within the school, and one on divorce. These two articles seemed to the petitioner Emerson, as well as petitioner Reynolds, to be inappropriate. Emerson was afraid that the articles were not anonymous enough and that students would be identified, also Emerson thought it unfair that the boyfriends and parents mentioned in these articles did not have the chance to defend themselves or the statements made against them. Also, the content of the articles about sex, contraceptives etc could be inappropriate for some students. Reynolds, the president of the school, was under the impression that there was no time for the articles to be edited to fix these issues and thus decided they should be deleted from the newspaper. The respondents then brought it to the district court who ruled it was not a violation of the 1st amendment, but the court of appeals ruled it was. Then the Supreme Court took the case and reversed the court of appeals decision.
The main argument the court made was that because it was a journalism class, that received grades and needed to follow certain guidelines the freedom of expression is slightly limited. Also, because it is the name and expenses of the school that go in to the paper they have more right to edit what goes in to it. If it were a student run magazine, or paper the situation would be different. The court explained the difference between this case and Tinker is that with Tinker the school is determining when to tolerate a student’s particular speech, but with this case the school is just determining whether to promote the particular speech by giving its name and resources. It can be argued that the articles would have interfered with school policy and education and were not following instruction for the journalism class and therefore it is not a violation of the student’s 1st amendment rights. So, the court found in favor of the petitioner.
The last case we have about student speech is Morse v. Frederick in 2007. In January 2002 when the Olympic Torch relay passed through Juneau, Alaska Juneau –Douglas High School allowed the students to take a small “field-trip” and watch as the relay passed by school. The respondent, Joseph Frederick a senior at JDHS came to school late that day. When the cameras and relay passed by he stood at the across the school with some friends, as he had not checked in to school yet, and held up a large banner that said “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” The entire school that went to watch the relay, as well as some news cameras, saw this banner. Principal Morse demanded Frederick to go to her office, and she then suspended him as he was suggesting and promoting the use of illegal drugs among his peers. This was a school violation and the sign was displayed during school hours at a school sanctioned event. The case was brought to the district court in which they used the Fraser decision to say the principal acted correctly as the banner intrudes upon the work of the school. The Supreme Court then had to see whether Frederick had a constitutional right to show the banner, and whether is he did if the principle was liable for charges. The Supreme Court found that Frederick had no such right.
The basis for this decision is that the sign held up directly had a negative effect on the school and its educational abilities, and caused disruption. Also, the banner promotes the use of illegal drugs which is a school violation and the school therefore has the right to punish that behavior. Frederick tried to argue that the banner was just nonsense and had no drug reference, but because of the vague and multiple interpretations it is still recognized as drug reference. In Tinker it was determined that student expression can only be suppressed if the expression disrupts the school. In Fraser, the difference is that Tinker was used for a political message and Fraser was of sexual innuendo, but Frederick adds a new element in as it has drug reference. It would be a different story if Frederick declared the sign had political or religious meaning, but because he does not there is no political debate or message he is trying to get across by revealing this banner. So because the banner did nothing other than disrupt the school, and violate a school rule about illegal drug implications the Supreme Court found in favor of Morse.
-Isabella
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Hate Seech
HATE SPEECH
The First Amendment to the Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” In the historical examination of hate speech, the First Amendment is immediately called into question and, in particular, (as you could probably deduce) the tidbit about “prohibiting abridging the freedom of speech”. Throughout history, various cases have arisen which have served to define the Supreme Court’s views and the constitutionality of hate speech. The decisions in recent cases such as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), American Booksellers v. Hudnut (1986), Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), and Virginia v. Black (2003) have enacted certiorari that is based upon the Court’s interpretations of the extent to which the expression of hate compromises free speech.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell represents a decision which regards the compensation of damages initially rewarded to public figure. Initially Jerry Falwell, a nationally known and respected minister who was also a frequently active political commentator, sued Hustler Magazine for a slanderous ad-parody in one of the issues that damaged the minister’s public reputation. Falwell was rewarded with 200,000 dollars in damages, yet Larry Flynt, head of Hustler Magazine, appealed the decision which then ended up in the Supreme Court. So in this particular Supreme Court analysis, Hustler Magazine is the petitioner and Jerry Falwell (hot-shot minister) is the respondent. The specific ad that caused all the commotion revolved around Campari Liqueur. Campari, a popular drink back in the day, utilized an ad campaign that featured the double entendre of the “first time”. Essentially, these ads would depict famous movie stars discussing their “first time” in what appeared sexually motivated, but in reality was actually depicting their first time drinking Campari (those gosh darn, sneaky ad execs). Well, Hustler Magazine capitalized on this campaign and fashioned their own parody of these ads which depicted Falwell incestuously talking about his first time with his mother in some outhouse while disguising it as a Campari ad, but this time the double entendre was reversed. Comical yet slanderous and downright wrong remarks such as, “Mom looked better than a Baptist whore with a $100 donation.” At the bottom of the page though, “ad parody—not to be taken seriously” appeared. This case introduces a fundamental argument about the First Amendment limitations in protecting a citizen from intentional emotional distress. Yet the loophole in this argument that forced the examination of its constitutionality results from the concept of a public figure. Jerry Falwell is indeed a public figure and the reason this is important is succinctly summed up by Justice Frankfurter who said, “One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures.” Thus the ensuing argument of does our prerogative as American citizens to criticize public figures outweigh the reaches of the First Amendment? And should the fame of an individual force them to withstand vicious ridicule and slander? Ultimately, the “court held that the First Amendment gives speakers immunity from sanction with respect to their speech concerning public figures unless their speech is both false and made with the knowledge of its falsehood or with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement.” Since the ad parody was both false and, at the same time, made no attempt to verify the false statement being made, the court reversed the decision. Thus, Flynt didn’t have to pay the 200,000 grand to Jerry Falwell on the grounds that Falwell was a public figure and that ad parody was falsely false.
American Booksellers vs. Hudnut features the respondent William H. Hudnut (the mayor of Indianapolis) and the petitioner American Booksellers. This case revolves around the controversial issue of pornography and the constitutionality of these so called “skin flicks” (and all other forms). The constitutionality was called into question because of the distinctions between “obscenity” and “pornography”. “Obscene” defined by the Miller v. California case in 1973 means “a publication must, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest, must contain patently offensive depictions or descriptions of specified sexual conduct, and on the whole have no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” The Indianapolis statute under question states that pornography is "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts; or (4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or (5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual; or (6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or display."
(use of men, children, and transsexuals are can be replaced with women in any of the paragraphs).
Yet the problem here is that this ordinance refrains from commenting on having lustful interests, offensiveness, and the standards of a community.
In the case Wisconsin v. Todd Mitchell, the Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of offensive thought. The background here is that Wisconsin has a Penalty-Enhancement Provision which enhances the penalty of a crime if the defendant “intentionally selects the person against whom the crime . . . is committed . . . because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person . . . .”. Todd Mitchell (an African American) was charged with aggravated assault on a white boy, but once it was found out that Mitchell had selected a white person in advance to beat up, the maximum sentence was bumped up significantly. The overwhelming constitutionality that is introduced with this case surrounds the interpretation of words. Under the precedent of R.A.V v. St. Paul (1992), “Wisconsin legislature cannot criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees....” The reasoning is that the term “bigoted” is entirely too subjective, meaning bigotry is difficult to classify. Mitchell argued that since the penalty enhancement provision referred to bigoted thought rather than merely “conduct” it is unconstitutional in terms of the First Amendment. Furthermore, Mitchell argued that this provision provides a “chilling effect” on free speech in that people everywhere would avoid all association with bigotry in fear that it would enhance the punishment of some un-related crime. While the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled Mitchell’s punishment, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to lower courts stating that bias motivated crimes lead to negative side-effects. In addition, the Supreme Court deemed Mitchell stances on bigoted thoughts and chilling effects far too speculative to be considerable.
Finally, Virginia v. Black features hate expression in terms of cross-burning. The respondent, Barry Elton Black, a Klu Klux Klan member was convicted of violating Virginia’s cross-burning statute that reads, “It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.” Additionally, “Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” The constitutionality in this case is based upon the “prima facie” or immediate evidence provision of this statute. In 2003, Black held a Klan gathering in Virginia 350 yards away from a highway road. This gathering concluded with the group burning a 25 foot cross. Sheriffs saw this demonstration and arrested Black on the spot on charges of cross-burning. Black appealed his conviction by stating, “the Virginia cross-burning statute is unconstitutional because it discriminates on the basis of content and viewpoint.” His stance was that the symbolism of cross-burning demonstrates a shared ideology among Klan members, rather than an act of intimidation. Therefore, since cross burning can be identified as a shared ideology, then cross-burning must not be prima facie. The Supreme Court made a ruling that upheld the unconstitutionality of cross-burning in general, but also deemed the Virginia statue unconstitutional which reversed Black’s sentence. Their mentality was that cross-burning is a criminal offense, but only if intimidation is proven. Therefore, in the state of Virginia, cross-burning is not prima facie and intent must be proven.
Bennett
The First Amendment to the Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” In the historical examination of hate speech, the First Amendment is immediately called into question and, in particular, (as you could probably deduce) the tidbit about “prohibiting abridging the freedom of speech”. Throughout history, various cases have arisen which have served to define the Supreme Court’s views and the constitutionality of hate speech. The decisions in recent cases such as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), American Booksellers v. Hudnut (1986), Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), and Virginia v. Black (2003) have enacted certiorari that is based upon the Court’s interpretations of the extent to which the expression of hate compromises free speech.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell represents a decision which regards the compensation of damages initially rewarded to public figure. Initially Jerry Falwell, a nationally known and respected minister who was also a frequently active political commentator, sued Hustler Magazine for a slanderous ad-parody in one of the issues that damaged the minister’s public reputation. Falwell was rewarded with 200,000 dollars in damages, yet Larry Flynt, head of Hustler Magazine, appealed the decision which then ended up in the Supreme Court. So in this particular Supreme Court analysis, Hustler Magazine is the petitioner and Jerry Falwell (hot-shot minister) is the respondent. The specific ad that caused all the commotion revolved around Campari Liqueur. Campari, a popular drink back in the day, utilized an ad campaign that featured the double entendre of the “first time”. Essentially, these ads would depict famous movie stars discussing their “first time” in what appeared sexually motivated, but in reality was actually depicting their first time drinking Campari (those gosh darn, sneaky ad execs). Well, Hustler Magazine capitalized on this campaign and fashioned their own parody of these ads which depicted Falwell incestuously talking about his first time with his mother in some outhouse while disguising it as a Campari ad, but this time the double entendre was reversed. Comical yet slanderous and downright wrong remarks such as, “Mom looked better than a Baptist whore with a $100 donation.” At the bottom of the page though, “ad parody—not to be taken seriously” appeared. This case introduces a fundamental argument about the First Amendment limitations in protecting a citizen from intentional emotional distress. Yet the loophole in this argument that forced the examination of its constitutionality results from the concept of a public figure. Jerry Falwell is indeed a public figure and the reason this is important is succinctly summed up by Justice Frankfurter who said, “One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures.” Thus the ensuing argument of does our prerogative as American citizens to criticize public figures outweigh the reaches of the First Amendment? And should the fame of an individual force them to withstand vicious ridicule and slander? Ultimately, the “court held that the First Amendment gives speakers immunity from sanction with respect to their speech concerning public figures unless their speech is both false and made with the knowledge of its falsehood or with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement.” Since the ad parody was both false and, at the same time, made no attempt to verify the false statement being made, the court reversed the decision. Thus, Flynt didn’t have to pay the 200,000 grand to Jerry Falwell on the grounds that Falwell was a public figure and that ad parody was falsely false.
American Booksellers vs. Hudnut features the respondent William H. Hudnut (the mayor of Indianapolis) and the petitioner American Booksellers. This case revolves around the controversial issue of pornography and the constitutionality of these so called “skin flicks” (and all other forms). The constitutionality was called into question because of the distinctions between “obscenity” and “pornography”. “Obscene” defined by the Miller v. California case in 1973 means “a publication must, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest, must contain patently offensive depictions or descriptions of specified sexual conduct, and on the whole have no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” The Indianapolis statute under question states that pornography is "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts; or (4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or (5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual; or (6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or display."
(use of men, children, and transsexuals are can be replaced with women in any of the paragraphs).
Yet the problem here is that this ordinance refrains from commenting on having lustful interests, offensiveness, and the standards of a community.
In the case Wisconsin v. Todd Mitchell, the Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of offensive thought. The background here is that Wisconsin has a Penalty-Enhancement Provision which enhances the penalty of a crime if the defendant “intentionally selects the person against whom the crime . . . is committed . . . because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person . . . .”. Todd Mitchell (an African American) was charged with aggravated assault on a white boy, but once it was found out that Mitchell had selected a white person in advance to beat up, the maximum sentence was bumped up significantly. The overwhelming constitutionality that is introduced with this case surrounds the interpretation of words. Under the precedent of R.A.V v. St. Paul (1992), “Wisconsin legislature cannot criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees....” The reasoning is that the term “bigoted” is entirely too subjective, meaning bigotry is difficult to classify. Mitchell argued that since the penalty enhancement provision referred to bigoted thought rather than merely “conduct” it is unconstitutional in terms of the First Amendment. Furthermore, Mitchell argued that this provision provides a “chilling effect” on free speech in that people everywhere would avoid all association with bigotry in fear that it would enhance the punishment of some un-related crime. While the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled Mitchell’s punishment, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to lower courts stating that bias motivated crimes lead to negative side-effects. In addition, the Supreme Court deemed Mitchell stances on bigoted thoughts and chilling effects far too speculative to be considerable.
Finally, Virginia v. Black features hate expression in terms of cross-burning. The respondent, Barry Elton Black, a Klu Klux Klan member was convicted of violating Virginia’s cross-burning statute that reads, “It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.” Additionally, “Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” The constitutionality in this case is based upon the “prima facie” or immediate evidence provision of this statute. In 2003, Black held a Klan gathering in Virginia 350 yards away from a highway road. This gathering concluded with the group burning a 25 foot cross. Sheriffs saw this demonstration and arrested Black on the spot on charges of cross-burning. Black appealed his conviction by stating, “the Virginia cross-burning statute is unconstitutional because it discriminates on the basis of content and viewpoint.” His stance was that the symbolism of cross-burning demonstrates a shared ideology among Klan members, rather than an act of intimidation. Therefore, since cross burning can be identified as a shared ideology, then cross-burning must not be prima facie. The Supreme Court made a ruling that upheld the unconstitutionality of cross-burning in general, but also deemed the Virginia statue unconstitutional which reversed Black’s sentence. Their mentality was that cross-burning is a criminal offense, but only if intimidation is proven. Therefore, in the state of Virginia, cross-burning is not prima facie and intent must be proven.
Bennett
Symbolic Expression is Freedom of Speech
After taking a look at four cases that have occurred over the years, it was evident that the First amendment, which protects American’s rights to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of press along with other rights is not always upheld. In certain situations, an America citizen will speak out against a government policy exercising their right to freedom of speech, when doing this they should be protected under the first amendment and shouldn’t be in fear of the law for expressing their thoughts.
In the first incident regarding free speech and the first amendment, a man named David Paul O’Brien burned his selective service certificate along with three others on the court house steps in Boston. There was a crowd who witnessed the event and soon members of the crowd began attacking O’Brien and he was arrested and brought into the courthouse where he was then charged with violating the 1965 Amendment that prohibited the destruction or mutilation of selective service certificates arguing that it was unconstitutional to deface them.
O’Brien was taken to court on these charges and he had never denied doing it. O’Brien who was the respondent in this case, defended his argument by saying that he was merely trying to make his feeling about the Vietnam War public. He wanted his anti-war beliefs to be known to others. O’Brien argued that it was unconstitutional for him to be charged with breaking the 1965 Amendment because his freedom of speech, which is granted in the first amendment were not being recognized. He believed that the 1965 Amendment served no real purpose and had no legal legitimacy. The constitutional question now at stake is whether or not the first amendment protects O’Brien’s rights to freedom of speech when there are no words actually spoken but an idea is being expressed.
O’Brien’s arguments were rejected and the jury deemed that they could not inquire on Congress’s motives when the 1965 Amendment was created. Most importantly though, it was stated that part of Congress’s powers include the right to raise armies. Their right to raise armies is protected under the necessary and proper clause and because of this Congress has the right to administer the selective service certificates and administer the draft during times of war making the action O’Brien took illegal.
The argument continued with O’Brien saying that Congress was not made to suppress freedom. He argued that by burning the certificate it represented his opposition to the Vietnam War and was therefore represented free speech. This created O’Brien’s main argument: symbolic acts of speech should be protected under the first amendment. O’Brien’s argument was not heard though and he was still convicted and from there on the precedent was set, Congress has the right to declare war and the draft and limit freedom of speech if they deem it “necessary and proper”.
The US government acted as the petitioner in the case of 1968 with O’Brien and set the precedent for the cases to follow. In 1970, Daniel Jay Schact was indicted by the US District Court for the violating a law stating that it is a crime for any person to wear a military uniform without authority. Schact was tried and convicted in February of 1968 and charged with a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars and up to six months in prison. Schact rebutted the case. He admitted that he had worn parts of a uniform but said that he was wearing the uniform as an actor. He claimed that he was doing a street skit and was acting. He had intended to do an anti-war demonstration in which the American presence in Vietnam was displayed as “evil.” The government decided that what Schact was doing was not a theatrical performance and so Schact could not claim that he was being an actor. The idea of the time became clear, the first amendment protected free speech when people were praising the war, but when people spoke out against the war, the constitution was not protecting them.
These same ideas were continued in the Spence v Washington case in 1974. The appellant had displayed his own US flag from his apartment window but he had taped a large peace symbol on it. Three Seattle police officers came up to his apartment and arrested him. Spence was being charged on “improper use,” which stated that the American flag could not be altered, marked or changed in anyway and could not be displayed in such a manner.
Spence was tried and convicted with a ninety-day confinement sentence. The case was reviewed again and Spence stuck to his case. He stated that he had put the peace symbol on the flag as a protest against the Cambodian invasion and the Kent State University killings. He wanted to associate the American flag with peace, “I felt there had been so much killing and that this was not what America stood for. I felt that the flag stood for America and I wanted people to know that I thought America stood for peace,”(Spence v Washington). He wanted to make it clear what his purpose was and that he made a temporary change to the flag, it was tape. Regardless of his testimony, the jury convicted him as guilty and he received ten days in jail and a seventy-five dollar fine.
There were additional factors taken into consideration though. The flag was privately owned and did not belong to the government. The flag was also displayed on private property and was not in a public area. Putting up the flag was not meant to cause violence. An important part of this case was the fact that what he displayed was a flag, “In many of their uses flags are a form of symbolism comprising a "primitive but effective way of communicating ideas,” (Spence v Washington). If the flag was therefore considered an expression and a form of speech then the first amendment was being violating.
The next case brought up was in 1989 between Texas and Gregory Lee Johnson. Gregory Lee Johnson was charged for desecrating the American flag and violating Texas Law during a public protest. There was a political demonstration to protest polices of the Reagan administration and the protest ended up in front of the Dallas City Hall. Johnson unveiled the flag and set it on fire. About a hundred protestors were chanting against America and only Johnson was convicted. He was tried and convicted with one year in prison and a two thousand dollar fine.
His conviction was said to be the flag burning and not the insulting words he used. The question then became whether or not Johnson could use the first amendment to help his case. The first amendment protected free speech and that could include more than just spoken words. During his case Johnson argued that he burned the flag as an expression of speech, “Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication, ‘to implicate the First Amendment’,”(Texas v Johnson). Texas then argued that Johnson was convicted because his expression was turning violent and they were trying to subdue the violence. Justice Stevens then took much time and deliberation on the case and decided that the flag deserves protection from desecration because it symbolizes the ideals of America.
In the case US v O’Brien, Congress asserted their power in a situation that they felt it was necessary. Although the case was about the defiance of the 1965 Amendment it all came back to the first amendment and being able to express freely. The same happened in the case with Shact. He defied the law but it was brought back to the constitutional idea of being able to have the freedom to express one’s self regardless of what they are saying even if they are speaking out against the government. In the Spence v Washington case, Spence was trying to express his views on American and how it should be more peaceful. His views should have been allowed to be expressed because even though he was “defying” American property by taping a peace sign onto the flag, he was trying to show his views and express them symbolically which should be protected under the first amendment. These same ideas followed all the way to the case of Texas v Johnson where he burned the American flag publically. He was arrested for disturbing the peace and defacing the American flag. The ruling should allow him to express his political beliefs regardless of what they are.
In all four cases the government has charged these people on different issues but the main issue behind each case is whether or not symbolic expression should be considered freedom of speech. If symbolic freedom is considered freedom of speech then it must be protected under the first amendment of the constitution.
In the first incident regarding free speech and the first amendment, a man named David Paul O’Brien burned his selective service certificate along with three others on the court house steps in Boston. There was a crowd who witnessed the event and soon members of the crowd began attacking O’Brien and he was arrested and brought into the courthouse where he was then charged with violating the 1965 Amendment that prohibited the destruction or mutilation of selective service certificates arguing that it was unconstitutional to deface them.
O’Brien was taken to court on these charges and he had never denied doing it. O’Brien who was the respondent in this case, defended his argument by saying that he was merely trying to make his feeling about the Vietnam War public. He wanted his anti-war beliefs to be known to others. O’Brien argued that it was unconstitutional for him to be charged with breaking the 1965 Amendment because his freedom of speech, which is granted in the first amendment were not being recognized. He believed that the 1965 Amendment served no real purpose and had no legal legitimacy. The constitutional question now at stake is whether or not the first amendment protects O’Brien’s rights to freedom of speech when there are no words actually spoken but an idea is being expressed.
O’Brien’s arguments were rejected and the jury deemed that they could not inquire on Congress’s motives when the 1965 Amendment was created. Most importantly though, it was stated that part of Congress’s powers include the right to raise armies. Their right to raise armies is protected under the necessary and proper clause and because of this Congress has the right to administer the selective service certificates and administer the draft during times of war making the action O’Brien took illegal.
The argument continued with O’Brien saying that Congress was not made to suppress freedom. He argued that by burning the certificate it represented his opposition to the Vietnam War and was therefore represented free speech. This created O’Brien’s main argument: symbolic acts of speech should be protected under the first amendment. O’Brien’s argument was not heard though and he was still convicted and from there on the precedent was set, Congress has the right to declare war and the draft and limit freedom of speech if they deem it “necessary and proper”.
The US government acted as the petitioner in the case of 1968 with O’Brien and set the precedent for the cases to follow. In 1970, Daniel Jay Schact was indicted by the US District Court for the violating a law stating that it is a crime for any person to wear a military uniform without authority. Schact was tried and convicted in February of 1968 and charged with a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars and up to six months in prison. Schact rebutted the case. He admitted that he had worn parts of a uniform but said that he was wearing the uniform as an actor. He claimed that he was doing a street skit and was acting. He had intended to do an anti-war demonstration in which the American presence in Vietnam was displayed as “evil.” The government decided that what Schact was doing was not a theatrical performance and so Schact could not claim that he was being an actor. The idea of the time became clear, the first amendment protected free speech when people were praising the war, but when people spoke out against the war, the constitution was not protecting them.
These same ideas were continued in the Spence v Washington case in 1974. The appellant had displayed his own US flag from his apartment window but he had taped a large peace symbol on it. Three Seattle police officers came up to his apartment and arrested him. Spence was being charged on “improper use,” which stated that the American flag could not be altered, marked or changed in anyway and could not be displayed in such a manner.
Spence was tried and convicted with a ninety-day confinement sentence. The case was reviewed again and Spence stuck to his case. He stated that he had put the peace symbol on the flag as a protest against the Cambodian invasion and the Kent State University killings. He wanted to associate the American flag with peace, “I felt there had been so much killing and that this was not what America stood for. I felt that the flag stood for America and I wanted people to know that I thought America stood for peace,”(Spence v Washington). He wanted to make it clear what his purpose was and that he made a temporary change to the flag, it was tape. Regardless of his testimony, the jury convicted him as guilty and he received ten days in jail and a seventy-five dollar fine.
There were additional factors taken into consideration though. The flag was privately owned and did not belong to the government. The flag was also displayed on private property and was not in a public area. Putting up the flag was not meant to cause violence. An important part of this case was the fact that what he displayed was a flag, “In many of their uses flags are a form of symbolism comprising a "primitive but effective way of communicating ideas,” (Spence v Washington). If the flag was therefore considered an expression and a form of speech then the first amendment was being violating.
The next case brought up was in 1989 between Texas and Gregory Lee Johnson. Gregory Lee Johnson was charged for desecrating the American flag and violating Texas Law during a public protest. There was a political demonstration to protest polices of the Reagan administration and the protest ended up in front of the Dallas City Hall. Johnson unveiled the flag and set it on fire. About a hundred protestors were chanting against America and only Johnson was convicted. He was tried and convicted with one year in prison and a two thousand dollar fine.
His conviction was said to be the flag burning and not the insulting words he used. The question then became whether or not Johnson could use the first amendment to help his case. The first amendment protected free speech and that could include more than just spoken words. During his case Johnson argued that he burned the flag as an expression of speech, “Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication, ‘to implicate the First Amendment’,”(Texas v Johnson). Texas then argued that Johnson was convicted because his expression was turning violent and they were trying to subdue the violence. Justice Stevens then took much time and deliberation on the case and decided that the flag deserves protection from desecration because it symbolizes the ideals of America.
In the case US v O’Brien, Congress asserted their power in a situation that they felt it was necessary. Although the case was about the defiance of the 1965 Amendment it all came back to the first amendment and being able to express freely. The same happened in the case with Shact. He defied the law but it was brought back to the constitutional idea of being able to have the freedom to express one’s self regardless of what they are saying even if they are speaking out against the government. In the Spence v Washington case, Spence was trying to express his views on American and how it should be more peaceful. His views should have been allowed to be expressed because even though he was “defying” American property by taping a peace sign onto the flag, he was trying to show his views and express them symbolically which should be protected under the first amendment. These same ideas followed all the way to the case of Texas v Johnson where he burned the American flag publically. He was arrested for disturbing the peace and defacing the American flag. The ruling should allow him to express his political beliefs regardless of what they are.
In all four cases the government has charged these people on different issues but the main issue behind each case is whether or not symbolic expression should be considered freedom of speech. If symbolic freedom is considered freedom of speech then it must be protected under the first amendment of the constitution.
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